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uma comparação entre Estados Unidos e Brasil
Helena Masullo**
AbstrAct
We know remarkably little about the use of  shareholder agreements in 
publicly held companies. This article builds upon empirical evidence to ad-
vance the theoretical understanding in comparative law of  how and why 
shareholders agreements are used by publicly traded firms. It also contri-
butes to the existing literature on comparative contract design. The eviden-
ce suggests great divergence in the incidence and content of  shareholder 
agreements in both countries. Consistent with prior studies, we find that 
shareholder agreements are frequent in Brazilian corporate culture, whe-
re they are used to coordinate corporate decision-making and bind direc-
tors’ votes, in such a way that the best corporate governance practices are 
being disregarded. But while conventional wisdom suggests that U.S. public 
corporations do not have shareholders agreements, such understanding is 
inaccurate. Nevertheless, the existing agreements differ from their Brazilian 
counterparts in that they are usually used in order to achieve a specific cor-
porate transaction. Many findings of  this study are surprising and challenge 
the current thinking in terms of  contract design. For example, it finds no 
major stylistic differences between the agreements of  the two countries, 
which contradicts the prevailing belief  that U.S. contracts are necessarily 
longer than those of  civil-law countries. Moreover, while arbitration appears 
as the preferred method of  dispute resolution in Brazil, U.S. parties opt for 
judicial dispute resolution with greater frequency, mostly in Delaware and 
New York courts.
Keywords: Shareholder agreement. Empirical research. Contract design 
and business law.
resumo
Sabe-se pouco sobre o uso de acordos de acionistas em companhias 
abertas. Este artigo utiliza evidências empíricas para progredir a compreen-
são teórica em direito comparado sobre a razão e a maneira pelas quais 
acordos de acionistas são utilizadas por companhias de capital aberto. O 
artigo também traz contribuições à literatura existente em direito contra-
tual. As evidências sugerem que existe uma diferença relevante em relação 
à existência e ao conteúdo de acordos de acionistas no Brasil e nos Es-
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tados Unidos. Coerente com estudos anteriores, des-
cobrimos que acordos de acionistas são frequentes na 
cultura corporativa brasileira, em que eles são utiliza-
dos para coordenar decisões corporativas e vincular os 
votos dos administradores, de modo que as melhores 
práticas de governança corporativa muitas vezes são 
desconsideradas. Embora a visão convencional indi-
que que as companhias abertas norte-americanas não 
possuem acordos de acionistas, tal visão é imprecisa. 
Não obstante, os acordos existentes no cenário norte-
-americano diferem daqueles utilizados por companhias 
brasileiras, uma vez que aqueles são normalmente utili-
zados para concretizar determinada operação societária. 
Diversas descobertas desse estudo são surpreendentes 
e desafiam o entendimento atual em termos de estilo 
contratual. Por exemplo, verificam-se poucas diferen-
ças estilísticas entre os acordos de acionistas dos dois 
países, o que contradiz o entendimento prevalecente de 
que os contratos norte-americanos são necessariamente 
mais longos do que aqueles proveniente de países de 
civil law. Além disso, enquanto a arbitragem parece ser o 
método preferido de resolução de disputas no Brasil, os 
norte-americanos optam por resolver disputas no âmbi-
to judicial com maior frequência, sobretudo nas cortes 
de Delaware e Nova Iorque. 
Palavras-Chave: Acordos de Acionistas. Pesquisa 
Empírica. Direito Societário e Contratual. 
1. IntroductIon
We know remarkably little about the use of  sha-
reholder agreements in publicly held companies. The 
existing corporate law literature generally focuses on 
shareholder agreements entered into by shareholders of  
privately held corporations1. However, such agreements 
are far absent in the context of  listed corporations. This 
article shows that shareholder agreements are present 
in publicly traded firms of  both civil law and common 
law countries and contributes to the enrichment of  the 
literature on this relevant corporate tool. 
A shareholder agreement is a contract that governs 
1 VENTORUZZO, Marco. Why Shareholders’ Agreements are 
not used in U.S. Listed Corporations: a Conundrum in Search of  
an Explanation. Penn State Law Research Paper, n. 42, 2013; CAR-
VALHOSA, Modesto. Acordo de acionistas: homenagem a Celso Barbi 
Filho. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2011. EIZIRIK, Nelson. A lei das S/A 
comentada. Cidade: Editora, 2011.
the relationship among shareholders through specific 
rights and duties not included in the articles of  incor-
poration or bylaws of  the company. It typically regula-
tes the manner in which shareholders vote and establish 
restrictions on the free transferability of  shares. Since 
shareholders agreements are generally governed by the 
rules of  contract law, they are endowed with greater fle-
xibility vis-à-vis other organizational documents. 
This study is based on a sample of  hand-collected 
shareholder agreements entered into by Brazilian and 
U.S. publicly traded firms between 2010 and 2012. It 
analyzes all relevant clauses of  a shareholder agree-
ment, investigating the following issues: voting agree-
ments, provisions concerning the election of  directors, 
restrictions on director’s corporate powers, limitations 
on the free transferability of  shares, the identity of  the 
shareholders of  the company and method of  dispute 
resolution.
The study focused on a period of  three years for two 
main reasons: to collect a relevant sample of  documents 
and to deal with technical issues regarding the collection 
and availability of  date. EDGAR’s electronic database 
does not have a specific field for shareholder agree-
ments, so that the author had to use the “full-text sear-
ch” field to find such documents. Such a time restriction 
helped to limit the number of  documents collected. To 
illustrate, in the short period of  three years the author 
had to analyze more than 8.000 documents to collect a 
sample of  69 shareholder agreements. Additionally, the 
period of  2010 to 2012 was specifically chosen to pro-
vide a current review on this corporate instrument and 
Brazilian studies conducted in previous years.
This provides the best comparative analysis of  sha-
reholder agreements of  public companies in different 
countries.  The author opted to compare the U.S. and 
Brazil to identify similarities and differences between 
contrasting corporate contexts. Brazil is a jurisdiction 
where, according to the existing literature2, shareholder 
agrrements play a key role in corporate governance. In 
contrast, although the U.S. is the jurisdiction with the 
largest equity markets and the focus of  corporate gover-
2 GORGA, Érica. Changing The Paradigm Of  Stock Owner-
ship From Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence 
From Brazil And Consequences For Emerging Countries. Northwest-
ern Journal of  International Law & Business, v. 29, p. 439-462-463, 2009; 
ALDRIGHI, Dante Mendes; MAZZER NETO, Roberto. Estrutura 
de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Bra-
sil. Revista de Economia Política, v. 25, p. 115-132, 2005.
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nance literature, U.S. shareholder agreements are mostly 
employed in relation to corporate transactions, addres-
sing specific issues. In this framework, the study aims 
to identify and explore possible effects of  shareholder 
agreements on the best corporate governance practices. 
The results of  this study challenge the conventio-
nal wisdom that shareholder agreements are not used 
in U.S. public corporations. Although rare, this study 
finds that such agreements are employed in several 
contexts by these companies, though mostly in connec-
tion with specific corporate transactions, such as voting 
agreements signed in connection with the closing of  a 
merger agreement. Moreover, the evidence shows that 
Brazilian public companies commonly use shareholder 
agreements to provide for central issues of  corporate 
governance, in such a way that they are truly frequent in 
Brazilian corporate culture. 
After examining their incidence in both countries, 
the author explores different hypotheses to explain 
why in Brazil shareholder agreements are vastly used 
by public companies while in the United States they are 
not. One possible explanation is that the tradition of  
concentrated control in Brazilian companies has encou-
raged non-controlling shareholders to enter into agree-
ments to establish (or share) corporate control. On the 
contrary, shareholders of  U.S. public companies do not 
recognize the same value in shareholder agreements. 
This may be explained by the relatively dispersed capital 
structure of  U.S. companies. After all, to sign an agree-
ment, a limited group of  shareholders is necessary and 
each of  them must have a significant number of  shares, 
in such a way that they will be able to make relevant 
decisions together. For example, if  a shareholder owns 
15% of  the corporation shares, but the next largest sha-
reholders own less than 1%, it would be inefficient for 
the block holder to seek an agreement with the other 
shareholders. Accordingly, this study compares how 
shareholder agreements impact the companies’ control 
in regimes with different capital structures. 
Furthermore, the two legal systems differ in their 
legal treatment of  shareholders agreements. The article 
indicates that, unlike the Brazilian legal framework, whi-
ch promotes the use of  shareholder agreements, U.S. 
law deters companies from using such agreements. It 
also discusses other potential explanations for the di-
fferent incidence of  shareholder agreements in both 
countries.
The best corporate governance practices reflect in-
dividual and collective interests of  shareholders, as well 
as the interests of  the stakeholders of  the company (as 
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors etc.). Accor-
ding to the Brazilian Institute of  Corporate Governan-
ce (IBGC), corporate governance is 
The system by which organizations are managed, 
monitored and encouraged, involving the 
relationship between owners, board of  directors, 
executive officers and control bodies. The best 
corporate governance practices convert principles 
into objective recommendations, aligning interests 
in order to preserve and optimize the value of  
the organization, facilitating access to capital and 
contributing to its longevity3. 
The best practices require respect for the following 
principles: transparency, accountability, equity and 
corporate responsibility4. The protection of  minority 
shareholders is one of  the basic conditions for an en-
vironment that fosters the best corporate governance 
practices, as it ensures fairness between shareholders 
and prevent the expropriation of  rights by controlling 
shareholders.
In this vein, this study argues that shareholder agree-
ments may operate in the same or in the opposite direc-
tion of  the best corporate governance practices, depen-
ding on their purpose and use. Taking this into account, 
this study shows that U.S. agreements do not restrict 
rights and obligations of  the shareholders and of  the 
management as much as the Brazilian agreements. For 
instance, while many Brazilian companies seek to use 
shareholder agreements to bind the votes of  corporate 
directors, U.S. agreements do not contain similar provi-
sions. This is consistent with related work by Erica Gor-
ga and Marina Gelman, which describes what they see 
as negative uses of  shareholder agreement in Brazil. As 
an example, they state that shareholder agreements that 
create limitations to the board of  directors are being 
used in such a way that the responsibility to act with 
independence and commitment in the full exercise of  
the Board is annulled5. In this sense, the study indicates 
3 IBCG. Governança Corporativa. Available at: <http://www.ibgc.
org.br/Secao.aspx?CodSecao=17>
4 IBCG. Governança Corporativa. Available at: <http://www.ibgc.
org.br/Secao.aspx?CodSecao=17>.
5 GORGA, Érica; GELMAN, Marina. O esvaziamento crescente 
do conselho de administração como efeito da vinculação de seu voto 
a acordos de acionistas no Brasil. In: INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO 
GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA, 13, 2012, São Paulo. Anais... 
São Paulo, 2012. 
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that a shareholder agreement may run over corporate 
law and market rules obliging protection of  minority 
shareholders and compliance with the best corporate 
governance practices, as equal treatment of  sharehol-
ders and fulfillment of  the duties of  loyalty and care by 
the directors and officers.
Nevertheless, there is significant debate in the lite-
rature about the merits of  shareholder agreements. For 
example, Morten Bennedsen and Daniel Wolfenzon su-
ggest that a shareholder agreement may be beneficial 
for minority shareholders, when granting veto powers 
on certain matters that must be deliberated by the gene-
ral meeting6. Furthermore, other studies suggest that it 
would be more difficult for a group of  shareholders who 
entered into an agreement to extract private benefits of  
control, as opposed to one controlling shareholder7. In 
this sense, the agreement enables companies to main-
tain an intermediate level between a single controlling 
shareholder and an extremely diffuse control of  capital. 
Consequently, it helps to reduce agency costs through 
management oversight by the signing shareholders and 
prevents the expropriation of  minority shareholders’ 
rights8. Thus, joint control through shareholder agree-
ments has some promise as a mechanism to reduce pri-
vate benefits of  control9.
Besides analyzing the typical rights and duties in-
cluded in shareholder agreements of  Brazilian and U.S. 
public firms and their incidence in both countries, this 
article will explore the contractual style of  the agree-
ments. There are theoretical discussions that claim 
that U.S. contracts are overly descriptive and detailed, 
as analyzed by Thomas Lundmark and John Langbein. 
The main finding of  this study contradicts the current 
thinking on contractual style in the sense that U.S. con-
tracts are inherently longer. It attests that there are no 
6 WOLFENZON, Daniel; BENNEDSEN, Morten. The Balance 
of  Power in Closely Held Corporations.  Journal of  Financial Econom-
ics, v. 58, p. 113 – 139, 2000.
7 HANSMANN, Henry; PARGENDLER, Mariana; GILSON, 
Ronald J. Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corpo-
rate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union. 
Stanford Law Review, Stanford, v. 63, p. 475-498, 2011.
8 HANSMANN, Henry; PARGENDLER, Mariana; GILSON, 
Ronald J. Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corpo-
rate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union. 
Stanford Law Review, Stanford, v. 63, p. 475-498, 2011.
9 HANSMANN, Henry; PARGENDLER, Mariana; GILSON, 
Ronald J. Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corpo-
rate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union. 
Stanford Law Review, Stanford, v. 63, p. 475-498, 2011.
relevant differences between shareholder agreements 
of  Brazil, a civil law country, and the U.S., a common 
law country, as they are similar in length. 
The goal of  this study is to document the use and 
content of  shareholder agreements in Brazilian public 
companies and compare it to the U.S. context, taking 
into account best corporate governance practices. Ba-
sed on this goal, it pursues a comparative analysis that 
takes into consideration quantitative and qualitative as-
pects of  the data collected. As a result, hypotheses are 
proposed to explain its main findings, in such a way that 
the comparative literature on corporate law is not only 
contested, but also enriched. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part II presents 
the empirical evidence on the use and content of  sha-
reholder agreements of  public companies in the U.S. 
and Brazil, in light of  existing corporate law scholar-
ship and taking into account possible effects on the best 
corporate governance practices. Part III outlines the 
main features of  the design of  shareholder agreement 
in both countries. Part IV draws conclusions and calls 
for discussion on the use of  shareholder agreements in 
comparative law. 
2. the  use And content of shAreholder 
Agreements In brAzIl compAred to the u.s.
The empirical evidence collected by the author10 
demonstrates that, between 2010 and 2012, 54 publicly 
held Brazilian companies signed 64 shareholder agree-
ments11. In the U.S., in this same period, approximately 
69 shareholder agreements were signed by 65 U.S. pu-
blic companies. Until December 2012, there were ap-
proximately 353 listed corporations in Brazil12, while in 
10 The study involves hand-collected data available from the 
shareholder agreements filed with CVM and with SEC. The author 
collected all Brazilian shareholder agreements signed between 2010 
and 2012, considering that CVM’s electronic database has a specif-
ic field indicating all existing shareholder agreements of  Brazilian 
public companies.  In relation to U.S. shareholder agreements, the 
author collected a sample of  the agreements signed between 2010 
and 2012, as EDGAR’s electronic database does not have a specific 
field for shareholder agreements, in such a way that the author had 
to use the “full-text search” field to find such documents. See infra 
Table 1 and  Table 2. 
11 Of  them, 39 companies were listed on a special segment of  
BM&FBOVESPA.
12 The World Bank, World Development Indicators: Stock markets, 
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the U.S. there were approximately 4,102 publicly held 
companies13. Illustratively, this means 1,58% of  U.S. pu-
blicly companies entered into a shareholder agreement 
in the period analyzed, while in Brazil, in the same pe-
riod, this number represents 15,29% of  Brazilian pu-
blic companies. Taking these numbers into account, it is 
possible to infer that Brazilian publicly held companies 
use shareholder agreements far more than the U.S listed 
corporations, in which such a corporate tool is not as 
typical. 
The empirical study confirms that shareholder 
agreement are intensely employed in Brazil, by means 
of  clauses that coordinate corporate decision-making, 
bind directors’ votes and intensely limit the free transfe-
rability of  shares. By contrast, in the U.S., shareholders 
sign an agreement in order mainly to achieve a corpo-
rate transaction, predominantly establishing rules to go-
vern the election of  directors and the transferability of  
shares.
Considering that shareholder agreements are com-
monly identified in the Brazilian context, a number of  
studies have analyzed the use of  such instrument. Érica 
Gorga empirically demonstrated that since the 1990s 
the use of  shareholder agreements has greatly increa-
sed in Brazil14. Similarly, a study conducted in 2001 by 
Dante Mendes Aldrighi and Roberto Mazzer Neto con-
cluded that shareholder agreements are a widespread 
practice among Brazilian companies15.
However, there is little American literature that 
addresses the theme of  shareholder agreement in U.S. 
public companies, as noted by Marco Ventoruzzo16. 
This may be explained by the fact that, in the U.S., 
shareholder agreements are commonly used by closed 
corporations. Nevertheless, although rare, the present 
study proves that they are identified in publicly held 
companies, mainly in some specific transactions, as the 
entrance of  an investment fund in the company. 
2014. Available at:   <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.4>. (last 
updated June 15, 2014).
13 The World Bank, World Development Indicators: Stock markets, 
2014. Available at: <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.4>. (last up-
dated June 15, 2014).
14 GORGA, Érica. Direito societário atual. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 
2013. 
15 ALDRIGHI, Dante Mendes; MAZZER NETO, Roberto. Es-
trutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto 
no Brasil. Revista de Economia Política, v. 25, p. 115-132, 2005. 
16 CLARK, Robert. Corporate Law. Litte, Brown, 1986.
There are different hypotheses to explain why listed 
companies in the U.S. employ shareholder agreements 
with comparatively little frequency. The first hypothesis 
relates to the historical predominance of  dispersed ow-
nership in U.S. public corporations. This is the classic 
thesis of  Adolf  Berle and Gardiner Means, who found 
that there is lack of  a satisfactory number of  holders 
with a substantial percentage of  shares in U.S publicly 
held corporations that would be able to represent a blo-
ck of  control or, at least, a relevant block of  common 
stock17. Most of  the times, a shareholder agreement is 
only beneficial when there is a limited group of  sha-
reholders with a significant number of  shares that will 
be able to take relevant decisions together. For example, 
if  a shareholder owns 20% of  the corporation shares, 
but the next largest shareholders own less than 1%, it 
would be futile or inefficient for the block holder to 
seek an agreement with the other shareholders18. 
Ownership dispersion is identified in the majority of  
U.S. public companies. In 1929, some companies alrea-
dy had a high level of  dispersion of  the capital stock, 
meaning that the sum of  the shares of  the twenty lar-
gest shareholders accounted for somewhere around 5% 
of  the total capital stock of  the company19. Neverthe-
less, there is an ongoing debate in the U.S. corporate 
literature that discusses the current trend toward owner-
ship concentration in that context.  
Clifford G. Holderness conducted a study that pro-
ves the existence of  shareholders holding significant 
percentage of  shares in U.S. public companies20. He be-
lieves that the level of  ownership concentration in the 
U.S. is similar to that observed in other countries21. In 
a sample of  375 companies, 96% of  them have block 
holders, that is, shareholders who have at least 5% of  
the company’s shares22. Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. 
17 BERLE Adolf  A.; MEANS, Gardiner C. The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1967. p. 47–65. 
18 VENTORUZZO, Marco. Why Shareholders’ Agreements are 
not used in U.S. Listed Corporations: a Conundrum in Search of  an 
Explanation. Penn State Law Research Paper, n. 42, 2013.  
19 BERLE, Adolf  A.; MEANS, Gardiner C. A moderna sociedade 
anônima e a propriedade privada. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Cultural, 1988. 
20 HOLDERNESS Clifford G. The Myth of  Diffuse Ownership 
in the United States. Review of  Financial Studies, v. 22, n. 4, p. 1378-
1379, 2009. 
21 HOLDERNESS Clifford G. The Myth of  Diffuse Ownership 
in the United States. Review of  Financial Studies, v. 22, n. 4, p. 1378-
1379, 2009.
22 HOLDERNESS Clifford G. The Myth of  Diffuse Ownership 
in the United States. Review of  Financial Studies, v. 22, n. 4, p. 1378-
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Gordon have also questioned the prevalence of  disper-
sed ownership in the U.S. They state that is common 
to find institutional investors with a relevant number 
of  shares in U.S. public companies23. They note that, in 
2011, institutional investors had, approximately, 70% of  
the shares of  the ten thousand largest public companies 
in the U.S.24. 
However, although a recent trend toward ownership 
concentration is emerging in the U.S, it is clear that this 
is still far from the ownership concentration identified in 
Brazilian companies. In most Brazilian companies, one 
or more shareholders share corporate control, meaning 
that they have, at least, 51% of  the company’s shares. 
According to Dante Mendes Aldrighi and Roberto Ma-
zzer Neto, on average, shareholder agreements of  Bra-
zilian companies involve three members and result in a 
concentration of  more than 80% of  the voting rights25. 
This number clearly contrasts with the 5% threshold 
used in Holderness’s study. In this sense, equity owner-
ship of  U.S. companies may, indeed, impact the use of  
shareholder agreements.  
The second hypothesis for the low use of  sharehol-
der agreements in U.S. public companies is the fact that 
most minority shareholders with significant shares of  
the company are institutional investors. Such investors, 
usually, do not want to limit their freedom to sell their 
shares or to vote in general meetings26. After all, most 
institutional investors have fiduciary duties related to the 
exercise of  their vote27, in such a way that they cannot 
limit this right by means of  a shareholder agreement.
Indeed, the evidence shows that clauses that restric-
ted the vote of  shareholders were mostly absent from 
the U.S. However, rules that establish the election of  the 
1384, 2009.
23 GORDON, Jeffrey N.; GILSON, Ronald J. The Agency Costs 
of  Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of  
Governance Rights. Columbia Law Review, v. 113, p. 863-866, 2013. 
24 GORDON, Jeffrey N.; GILSON, Ronald J. The Agency Costs 
of  Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of  
Governance Rights. Columbia Law Review, v. 113, p. 863-866, 2013.
25 ALDRIGHI, Dante Mendes; M. NETO, Roberto. Estrutura de 
propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil. 
Revista de Economia Política, v. 25, p. 115-132, 2005.
26 VENTORUZZO, Marco. Why Shareholders’ Agreements are 
not used in U.S. Listed Corporations: a Conundrum in Search of  an 
Explanation. Penn State Law Research Paper, n. 42, 2013.  
27 GORDON, Jeffrey N.; GILSON, Ronald J. The Agency Costs 
of  Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of  
Governance Rights. Columbia Law Review, v. 113, p. 863-879–881, 
2013.
directors and limit the free transferability of  shares were 
identified. This may indicate that, for institutional inves-
tors, a shareholder agreement might work as an efficient 
tool to influence the governance of  the company and 
to guarantee their investment through clauses that limit 
the free transferability of  shares to other shareholders. 
The third hypothesis is the lack of  extensive cross-
-holdings among listed corporations28. Interlocking 
participations among major shareholders in different 
companies would be an incentive to use shareholder 
agreements, since these shareholders would enter into 
these agreements in such a way that one of  them would 
have control on the voting shares of  one company whi-
le the other would control the other company.
As forth hypothesis, in the U.S. there are legal rules 
that prevent publicly held companies from using sha-
reholder agreements29. First, minority shareholders are 
highly protected by law, in such a way that a relevant 
holder of  the company would face high costs to sign 
a shareholder agreement with a large number of  small 
holders. Secondly, block holders are subjected to a num-
ber of  rules, as the Williams Act30. According to this 
Act, the beneficial owners of  5% or more of  common 
stock must disclose their participations, indicating also 
the purpose of  further acquisitions of  the company’s 
shares31. Possibly, the members of  a shareholder agree-
ment may be considered a group for disclosure pur-
poses. However, some investors might be unwilling to 
reveal their strategies of  capital investing, creating a di-
sincentive to sign of  shareholder agreements. 
Another example is identified in Delaware’s Corpo-
ration Act, section 203, that provides that stockholders 
who acquire beneficial ownership of  more than 15% 
of  the stock of  the company without prior approval of  
the board of  directors turn into interested stockholders. 
In this sense, they cannot enter into business combina-
tions, as mergers, with the corporation for a period of  3 
28 GORDON, Jeffrey N.; GILSON, Ronald J. The Agency Costs 
of  Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of  
Governance Rights. Columbia Law Review, v. 113, p. 863-881, 2013.
29 VENTORUZZO, Marco. Why Shareholders’ Agreements are 
not used in U.S. Listed Corporations: a Conundrum in Search of  an 
Explanation. Penn State Law Research Paper, n. 42, 2013.   
30 VENTORUZZO, Marco. Why Shareholders’ Agreements are 
not used in U.S. Listed Corporations: a Conundrum in Search of  an 
Explanation. Penn State Law Research Paper, n. 42, 2013.   
31 Securities Exchange Act of  1934 (48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. 78a-
78kk). 
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years without supermajority approvals32.
This forth hypothesis arises from Mark Roe’s the-
sis. According to Roe, the dispersed ownership of  U.S. 
companies is the result of  political decisions motiva-
ted by the fear of  concentrating economic power33. He 
believes that shareholder’s activism is inhibited by legal 
norms34, in such a way that if  such rules did not exist, 
the ownership structure in the U.S. would be more con-
centrated and, as a result, property would not have been 
separated from control35. 
In this same vein, Black believes that the ownership 
structure in the U.S. can be explained by legal norms. 
He says that institutional investors are not active sha-
reholders because they face information costs to decide 
which governance matters they will support, as well as 
to organize themselves in collective action to influence 
the directors of  the company36. Black states that legal 
norms exacerbate this problem for hindering acquisi-
tion of  a relevant number of  shares, collective action of  
institutional investors and capability to choose directors 
to the Board37. Thus, shareholder agreements may be 
prevented in the context of  U.S. public corporations for 
the reason that legal norms are not friendly to its usual 
purpose of  collective action.
This legal landscape really differs from the one iden-
tified in Brazil, where the legal framework contributes 
to the signing of  shareholder agreements by public 
companies. For example, when the Brazilian Corpora-
tion Law was changed in 2001, by Law 10.303/2001, 
norms related to shareholder agreement were modified 
to formally bind directors to such agreements38. 
Finally, the last hypothesis is that U.S. shareholders 
have alternatives to shareholder agreement to streng-
then their positions in the company. In the U.S., con-
32 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001).  
33 ROE, Mark J. Strong managers, weak owners: the political roots of  
american corporate finance. Cambrigde: Harward Law, 1994. p. 24. 
34 ROE, Mark J. Strong managers, weak owners: the political roots 
of  american corporate finance. Cambrigde: Harward Law, 1994. p. 
13-15.  
35 ROE, Mark J. Strong managers, weak owners: the political roots of  
american corporate finance. Cambrigde: Harward Law, 1994. p. 24.  
36 BLACK, Bernard S. Shareholder Activism and Corporate Gov-
ernance in the United States. The New Palgrave Dictionary of  Economics 
and the Law, v. 3, p. 459-475, 1998. 
37 BLACK, Bernard S. Shareholder Activism and Corporate Gov-
ernance in the United States. The New Palgrave Dictionary of  Economics 
and the Law, v. 3, p. 459-475, 1998.
38 See Brazilian Corporation Law (Law 6.404), art. 118.  
trolling shareholders increasingly use dual-classes sha-
res structures, which may be taking the place of  the 
shareholder agreement39. This reason seems to be only 
applicable to U.S. companies, since although Brazilian 
corporations can create preferred shares, shareholder 
agreements are still used. 
A. The main objectives of signing shareholders
In Brazil, the study shows that most of  the agree-
ments were signed by shareholders that aimed to cons-
titute a block of  control. The reasons for the formation 
of  a block of  control are several; as establishment of  
shared control, enter of  a strategic shareholder in the 
company, organization of  the family power and crea-
tion of  joint ventures. In the Brazilian context, a control 
block is formed through the contribution of, at least, 
51% of  the voting shares of  the company, which are 
necessary to the achievement of  the absolute majority 
of  the votes in the general meetings.
It was identified that in 44 Brazilian agreements 
(68,75% of  the total analyzed) the signing sharehol-
ders have more than 50% of  the ordinary capital of  the 
company. This data may indicate a change in the owner-
ship structure of  Brazilian companies, which is beco-
ming more dispersed. Typical shareholder agreements 
used to be signed between the controlling shareholder 
and the minority shareholders, which desired to protect 
their economic interest in the company. However, such 
agreements are now being celebrated between minori-
ty shareholders who do not dispose of  the power of  
control of  the company individually, but, by means of  
a shareholder agreement, acquire this power40. Gorga 
corroborates this evidence of  the article. She believes 
that the recent tendency of  dispersed capital structure 
of  Brazilian companies favored the creation of  formal 
coalition between the shareholders, by means of  sha-
reholder agreements that are essential to the corporate 
governance of  the company41. 
39 VENTORUZZO, Marco. Why Shareholders’ Agreements are 
not used in U.S. Listed Corporations: a Conundrum in Search of  an 
Explanation. Penn State Law Research Paper, n. 42, 2013.   
40 CARVALHOSA, Modesto. Acordo de acionistas: homenagem a 
Celso Barbi Filho. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2011. 
41 GORGA, Érica. Corporate Control & Governance after a 
Decade from “Novo Mercado”: Changes in Ownership Structures 
and Shareholder Power in Brazil. Yale Law & Economics Research Pa-
per, n. 502, 2014.
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It was not possible to identify the stake of  the sha-
reholders of  U.S. companies. However, the study revea-
led that in American agreements the parties do not es-
tablish themselves as a control block. This contrasts to 
what has been identified in Brazil, where the sharehol-
ders clearly state that they must be jointly considered 
the controlling shareholder of  the company. It seems 
that the shareholders of  a U.S. company do not have 
this aim of  creating a block of  control. Contrariwise, 
they are mainly motivated to have some specifics rights 
guaranteed, as electing a director of  the company, and 
not to jointly act as a block. 
These evidences lead to the following hypothesis: 
Brazil is moving towards dispersed control in public 
companies, which may be explained by the role assu-
med by Novo Mercado, a special listing segment of  
BM&FBOVESPA, the main stock exchange in Brazil, in 
which common stock overlap preferred stock and rules 
that protect the minority shareholders are continuou-
sly preventing a single shareholder to command the 
company42. BM&FBOVESPA has three special listing 
segments: Level 1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado. These 
segments were launched to foster the best corporate go-
vernance practices in the capital markets, since a com-
pany listed in one of  these segments must comply with 
stricter requirements regarding corporate governance43. 
The requirements include disclosure and transparency 
duties (all segments), maintenance of  a certain degree 
of  free-float (all segments), unified term of  two years 
maximum to all directors (Level 2 and Novo Mercado), 
presence of  independent directors (Novo Mercado), 
voting rights granted to non-voting shareholders in 
some matters (Level 2) or the rule one-share-one-vote 
(Novo Mercado), tag-along rights (Level 1, Level 2 and 
Novo Mercado), obligation to hold a tender offer in 
some events (Level 2 and Novo Mercado) and adheren-
ce to the Market Arbitration Panel (Level 2 and Novo 
Mercado)44. Novo Mercado is considered the most rigo-
42 GORGA, Érica. Changing The Paradigm Of  Stock Owner-
ship From Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence 
From Brazil And Consequences For Emerging Countries. Northwest-
ern Journal of  International Law & Business, v. 29, p. 439-462, 2009. 
43 BOVESPA. O que são segmentos de listagem. Available at: 
<http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/servicos/solucoes-para-
empresas/segmentos-de-
listagem/o-que-sao-segmentos-de-listagem.aspx?Idioma=pt-br>.
44 BOVESPA. O que são segmentos de listagem. Available at: 
<http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/servicos/solucoes-para-
empresas/segmentos-de-
listagem/o-que-sao-segmentos-de-listagem.aspx?Idioma=pt-br>.
rous segment for being the only segment that requires 
the one-share-one-vote rule and tag-along for all mino-
rity shareholders at the same price paid for the shares of  
the controlling shareholder.
Canellas and Leal analyzed the structure of  pro-
priety and control of  the Brazilian companies listed at 
BM&FBOVESPA between 2004 and 200645 and also 
concluded that dispersed ownership has increased in 
Brazil, especially at Novo Mercado46.
 In this context, shareholder agreements are seen as 
effective mechanisms to establish control power. In the 
study, it is noticed that these agreements are common-
ly used by shareholders holding small values of  shares 
when comparing to the percentage held by a major sha-
reholder, which is typically 51% or more of  the total 
stock of  the company. These shareholders enter into 
an agreement in order to form a control block repre-
senting the majority of  shares or, at least, to create a 
relevant group of  shareholders that will make decisions 
together.
A shareholder agreement may be positive when it allows 
Brazilian companies to maintain an intermediate level of  
capital distribution between a single controlling sharehol-
der and an extremely diffused control. The agreement may 
ensure stability to a group of  shareholders that jointly hold 
the control of  the company, preventing the creation of  
new coalitions and the appearance of  desertions that would 
destabilize the control group47. In this sense, such corpora-
te tool facilitates the implementation of  joint control and 
inhibits ownership concentration by a single majority sha-
reholder that could easily expropriate minority shareholder 
rights48. Additionally, this tool can help reduce agency costs, 
since the shareholders that signed the agreement may be 
more efficient in supervising the management of  the com-
pany when compared to the supervision of  a single sha-
reholder. 
45 LEAL, Ricardo P. C.; CANELLAS, Thiago Costa. Evolução da 
Estrutura de Controle das Empresas Listadas na Bovespa entre 2004 
e 2006, 387 Relatórios Coppead 01, 18-19 (2009).
46 LEAL, Ricardo P. C.; CANELLAS, Thiago Costa. Evolução da 
Estrutura de Controle das Empresas Listadas na Bovespa entre 2004 
e 2006, 387 Relatórios Coppead 01, 18-19 (2009).
47 GOMES, Armando; NOVAES, Walter. Multiple Large Share-
holders in Corporate Governance 26 (February 17, 1999) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author).
48 HANSMANN, Henry; PARGENDLER, Mariana; GILSON, 
Ronald J. Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate 
Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union. Stan-
ford Law Review, Stanford, v. 63, p. 475-498, 2011.
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However, a legal problem arises when a shareholder 
agreement establishing a block of  control leads to viola-
tions of  best corporate governance practices. This takes 
place when the agreement removes key corporate decisions 
from the minority shareholders and the managers of  the 
company. Controlling shareholders feel uncomfortable to 
grant powers to minority shareholders, fearing that their 
intrusion in the course of  business will cause mismanage-
ment and loss of  control, which could negatively impact 
the value of  the company’s shares. Accordingly, ownership 
concentration through a shareholder agreement may create 
an agency problem between the largest holders and the mi-
nority shareholders as the company´s control remains with 
a restricted group of  shareholders that is not concerned 
with the interests of  the minority.
La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes and Shleifer believe that the 
structure of  propriety and control of  public companies is 
the result of  the legal protection granted to minority sha-
reholders49. In such countries where minorities are legally 
protected and where the enforcement is effective, corpora-
te ownership tends to be less concentrated50.
Although the Brazilian capital market is advan-
cing in the protection of  minority rights and moving 
towards dispersed ownership, which can be mainly 
explained by the creation of  special listing segments 
at BM&FBOVESPA, ownership in Brazil is still con-
centrated. Gorga has demonstrated that concentrated 
ownership rises in those listing segments where the 
rule one-share-one-vote does not exist51. In other wor-
ds, dispersed ownership is only relevant at the Novo 
Mercado segment. In this sense, moving away from the 
Novo Mercado, the law is still insufficient in the protec-
tion of  minority shareholders52. Such inadequate legal 
protection is mainly identified in the move away of  the 
rule one-share-one-vote, which is enabled by the use of  
some mechanisms, as preferred shares53. 
49 LA PORTA, Rafael; LOPES-DE-SILANES, Florencio; SH-
LEIFER, Andrei. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal 
of  Finance, Cambridge, v.2, 1999.
50 ALDRIGHI, Dante Mendes; M. NETO, Roberto. Estrutura de 
propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil. 
Revista de Economia Política, v. 25, p. 115-132, 2005.
51 GORGA, Érica. Changing The Paradigm Of  Stock Owner-
ship From Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence 
From Brazil And Consequences For Emerging Countries. Northwest-
ern Journal of  International Law & Business, v. 29, p. 439-463, 2009.
52 ALDRIGHI, Dante Mendes; MAZZER NETO, Roberto. Es-
trutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto 
no Brasil. Revista de Economia Política, v. 25, p. 115-132, 2005.
53 ALDRIGHI, Dante Mendes; MAZZER NETO, Roberto. Es-
The research leads to the conclusion that compa-
nies listed in Novo Mercado do not necessarily com-
ply with rules concerning the protection of  minority 
shareholders, since shareholder agreements may violate 
the proportionality between political power and eco-
nomic rights. Although the study shows that 46% of  
the analyzed Brazilian companies are listed in Novo 
Mercado, 60% of  them represent a block of  control 
that owns more than 50% of  the company’s capital and 
80% of  them establish voting obligations that reloca-
te the voting power between shareholders, as the pre-
vious meeting mechanism, deliberations in the general 
meetings that depend on the previous manifestation of  
specific shareholders and obligation to vote jointly in 
general meetings. In this sense, shareholder agreements 
are overriding stricter listing segment rules. 
The study further analyzed who were the parties to 
the shareholder agreement in both countries. The sha-
reholder that was most identified in Brazil was Brazi-
lian legal entities (41 agreements, equivalent to 59,42%), 
while private individuals were identified in 37 contracts 
(57,81%). In the U.S., legal entities were identified in 
59 agreements (85,5%) and private individuals in 36 
(52,17%). Though the study brings only a sample of  the 
shareholder agreements of  public companies in both 
countries, the state presence in Brazilian agreements 
is evident. In 11 Brazilian agreements (17,18%) state 
presence is identified, by means of  pension funds (as 
FUNCEF), state actors and BNDES. This may indicate 
the relevance of  public financial support to Brazilian 
companies and this finding may collaborate with further 
studies on this matter.
B. Tight control of directors and corporate matters  
The election of  directors is intensely ruled by sha-
reholder agreements in both countries, in the sense that 
such tool becomes relevant in the establishment of  con-
ditions to the corporate governance of  the company. 
The study shows that 44 Brazilian agreements (68,75%) 
create conditions to the election of  the members of  the 
board of  directors by the shareholders. In the U.S., 57 
agreements (82,60%) have such clause. 
Both Brazilian and American corporate law provide 
that shareholders must elect the directors of  the com-
trutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto 
no Brasil. Revista de Economia Política, v. 25, p. 115-132, 2005.
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pany in general meetings. Thus, a shareholder agree-
ment that seeks to regulate the director’s election must 
have a clause that obliges the signatory shareholders to 
jointly exercise their vote in such general meetings. The-
refore, agreements that regulate the election of  direc-
tors consist in a voting agreement.
Besides establishing the election of  directors, the 
agreements analyzed settled mandatory provisions to 
the board of  directors. These provisions were more 
identified in Brazil than in the U.S. as 25 Brazilian agree-
ments (39%) have such provisions. Particularly, 15 of  
them imposed the election of  the executive officers of  
the company by the shareholders, although according to 
the article 142 of  the Brazilian Corporate Law the offi-
cers’ election is an exclusive competency of  the board 
of  directors54. Curiously, 13 of  such 15 agreements are 
listed in a special segment of  BM&FBOVESPA (Level 
1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado). In this sense, not only 
corporate law is being infringed, but also market rules 
that demand the independence of  directors.
Gorga and Gelman studied the rise of  Brazilian sha-
reholder agreements that restrict directors’ vote throu-
gh the so called “umbrella clauses”. Such clauses allow 
the previous control of  directors’ decisions by the sha-
reholders party to the agreement55. The article corrobo-
rates such discovery as it shows that the “previous mee-
ting” mechanism was verified in 42 Brazilian companies 
(65,62%) signed between 2010 an 2012. In 25 of  such 
agreements (39%), the previous meeting extends to the 
deliberations of  the board of  directors. This means that 
previously of  any directors’ meeting the shareholders 
have the power to decide how the directors elected by 
them will vote. 
In 2007, the umbrella clauses were used by appro-
ximately 38% of  the Brazilian shareholder agreements 
that bounded directors56. In 2012 this number increa-
sed, as clauses were identified in approximately 67% of  
the agreements57. This means a rise of  76% of  umbrella 
clauses in the Brazilian context58.
54 Brazilian Corporation Law (Law 6.404), art. 142.  
55 GORGA, Érica. Direito societário atual. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 
2013. p. 197-198.
56 GORGA, Érica. Direito societário atual. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 
2013. p. 197-198.
57 GORGA, Érica. Direito societário atual. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 
2013. p. 197-198.
58 GORGA, Érica. Direito societário atual. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 
2013. p. 197-198.
In such framework, Brazilian shareholder agree-
ments seem to be indeed operating in the opposite 
direction of  the best corporate governance practices. 
Shareholder agreements that establish limitations to the 
board of  directors have been used as a mechanism of  
annulment of  the duties of  independence and commit-
ment in the full exercise of  the Board. This absence 
of  independence may be even illegal when matters that 
must be exclusively deliberated by the directors are not 
an exception to umbrella clauses, as provided by art. 142 
of  the Brazilian Corporate Law59. After all, the interests 
of  the controlling shareholders cannot be presumed 
to be in accordance with the corporate interest of  the 
company itself. This situation, therefore, contrasts with 
the expected development of  the Brazilian securities 
market and with the promotion of  the best practices 
of  corporate governance, as it requires independence to 
the board of  directors.
In the U.S. agreements, such mandatory provisions 
towards directors were mostly not identified. Only 7 
agreements (10,14%) limited Director’s power, but in 
a less restrictive way than the one identified in Brazi-
lian agreements. This context may be explained by two 
reasons. First, in the U.S., fiduciary duties of  directors 
cannot be easily expropriated by a shareholder agree-
ment, since they are not bounded to restrictions on 
their vote imposed by shareholders60, which contrasts 
with paragraphs 7 and 8 of  the article 118 of  the Brazi-
lian Corporate Law, which binds directors’ votes to sha-
reholder agreements61. Secondly, the company itself  is 
part of  American shareholder agreements, what means 
that obligations created towards the company end up 
obligating its managers. Thus, it would not be necessa-
ry to create direct obligations to the managers of  the 
company. 
In relation to corporate decisions, Brazilian voting 
agreements are intensely used to influence the delibera-
tions of  the general meetings and of  the board of  direc-
tors. The previous meeting stands out as a mechanism 
that restrict such decision-making bodies. As have been 
demonstrated above, it was used in 42 Brazilian agree-
59 GORGA, Érica. Direito societário atual. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 
2013. p. 197-198.
60 Corporation Law Committee of  the Association of  the Bar 
of  the City of  New York, The Enforceability and Effectiveness of  Typical 
Shareholders Agreement Provisions, 65 The Business Lawyer 1153, 1163 
(2010). 
61 Brazilian Corporation Law (Law 6.404), art. 118. 
M
A
SU
LL
O
, H
ele
na
. S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 in
 p
ub
lic
ly 
tra
de
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
: a
 c
om
pa
ris
on
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
U.
S.
 a
nd
 B
ra
zi
l. 
Re
vi
st
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
12
, n
. 2
, 2
01
5 
p.
 4
01
-4
19
412
ments (65,62%) analyzed in the study. In this sense, sha-
reholder agreements assume a central position in the 
corporate governance of  Brazilian publicly held compa-
nies, which goes beyond the election of  directors. 
The wild range of  deliberations subjected to the pre-
vious meeting excels. As an example, 59,5% of  the pre-
vious meetings identified in Brazilian agreements occur 
previously of  any meeting of  the general meeting of  
shareholders and of  the board of  directors. By means 
of  such clause, the shareholders party to the agree-
ment will meet and decide not only how themselves will 
vote on general meetings, but also how the directors 
elected by them will vote on the board of  directors. 
In this sense, not only the independence of  directors 
is harmed, but also the corporate rule one-share-one-
-vote, since the previous meeting relocates the voting 
power between shareholders62. Once again we identify 
the legal problem associated with Brazilian shareholder 
agreements: they are overriding the best corporate go-
vernance practices, as the rule one-share-one-vote, the 
principle of  equal treatment for all shareholders and the 
independence of  directors.
Voting agreements not related to the election of  di-
rectors were almost not identified in the American con-
text. Particularly, the previous meeting mechanism was 
not identified. Such assessment leads to the conclusion 
that although voting agreements are allowed by Ameri-
can corporate law, they are not as explored as in Brazil. 
This situation may be explained by the legal compe-
tency granted to the general meeting in U.S. companies. 
As an example, in the Delaware Corporation Law the 
right to vote of  the shareholders is essentially limited to 
the election of  directors and to the approval of  amen-
dments to the bylaws, mergers and acquisitions, sell of  
all assets of  the company and spontaneous dissolution 
of  the company63. However, only the election of  direc-
tors and amendments to the bylaws do not require the 
prior approval of  the board of  directors64. In contrast, 
art. 122 of  the Brazilian Corporate Law provides an 
extensive number of  matters that must be exclusively 
deliberated by the shareholders of  the company65. Also, 
62 GORGA, Érica. Corporate Control & Governance after a 
Decade from “Novo Mercado”: Changes in Ownership Structures 
and Shareholder Power in Brazil. Yale Law & Economics Research Pa-
per, n. 502, 2014.
63 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109 211 (2001).  
64 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109 211 (2001).  
65 Brazilian Corporation Law (Law 6.404), art. 122.
in art. 121 of  such Brazilian law it is established that the 
general meeting has the power to decide on all business 
related to the “corporate purpose” of  the company66. 
Thus, the competences of  the general meeting in both 
countries seem to be a reasonable explanation on why 
voting agreements are differently explored in Brazil and 
in the U.S.
C. Mandatory limitations to the free transferabi-
lity of shares
Clauses that limit the free transferability of  shares 
stands out in both countries, although in Brazil they are 
more often used. Particularly, three types of  clauses ex-
celled, which were: tag-along, right of  first refusal and 
lock up. Such clauses are usually employed to guarantee 
the investment of  the shareholders in the company or 
to prevent the sudden withdrawn of  any shareholder 
of  the company and the consequent entrance of  a new 
shareholder that could mislead business. 
The tag-along clause was used by 30 Brazilian agree-
ments (46,87%) and by 19 U.S. agreements (27,53%). 
On its turn, the right of  first refusal was identified in 42 
agreements from Brazil (65,6%) and in 15 from the U.S. 
(21,73%). Finally, the lock up clause was employed by 
18 Brazilian contracts (28,12%) and by 12 U.S. contracts 
(17,39%). Other clauses were identified in both con-
texts, as call, put and drag-along. However, they do not 
represent a relevant number in the analyzed agreements. 
The use of  clauses limiting the free transfer of  sha-
res indicates a concern of  shareholders to maintain 
and stabilize their interest in the company. This finding 
raises the question if  such clauses would be legitima-
te in an environment of  public traded shares, mostly 
in the special listing segments of  BM&FBOVESPA in 
which free-float levels are mandatory. For example, in 
Level 1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado companies must 
comply with the requirement of  25% of  the its shares 
in free float. However, the study indicates that 33% of  
the analyzed companies listed in these segments have 
shareholder agreements signed between shareholders 
representing more than 75% of  the company’s capital, 
in such a may that limiting the free transferability of  
shares ends up preventing the fulfillment of  free-float 
mandatory rules. 
66 Brazilian Corporation Law (Law 6.404), art. 121. 
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Moreover, in Brazil, clauses limiting the free transfer 
of  shares may result in unpredictable conflicts. On the 
one hand, the lock up clause may benefit the current 
shareholders of  the company, since it prevents sudden 
fluctuations in the share price. On the other hand, it 
ends up restricting the liquidity of  shares of  “locked 
up” shareholders, in such a way that the restriction may 
impact the price of  the company’s shares proportionally 
to the number of  shares of  the “locked up” stockhol-
ders, as illiquidity usually affect stock prices. 
It can also be noticed that U.S. agreements use stan-
dstill provisions. Standstill clauses intend to discourage 
any hostile acquisition of  the company. It usually pro-
vides for previous approval of  any relevant acquisition 
offer by the company and prevents submission and ap-
proval of  offers by the shareholders. This clause was 
identified in 23% of  the U.S. shareholder agreements. 
The standstill clause was only identified in U.S. sharehol-
der agreements, which may be explained by the fact that 
the U.S. corporate context is more dispersed than the 
Brazilian context; meaning that American companies 
are more subjected to hostile acquisitions than Brazilian 
corporations, since the last usually have a controlling 
shareholder or block of  control.
D. Contrasting views on Dispute Resolution
In Brazil, the dispute resolution method most used 
was arbitration. The arbitration was established in 50 
agreements (78,12%), while the judiciary was identified 
in 14 agreements (21,88%). Such data indicates that 
Brazilian companies do not trust the judiciary to resol-
ve any corporate disputes, mainly for its slowness and 
lack of  technical expertise. In this context, arbitration 
appears to be a good solution, since it rapidly set a qua-
lified body to deal with any corporate dispute. Moreo-
ver, this can be explained by that fact that many of  the 
companies analyzed were listed in Level 2 and Novo 
Mercado of  BM&FBOVESPA, where adherence to the 
Market Arbitration Panel is mandatory.
In its turn, in the U.S., the judiciary prevails. In 49 
U.S. agreements (71%) the judiciary was chosen to re-
solve any issue that arises from the agreement. The ar-
bitration only appeared in 5 agreements (7,25%). Thus, 
American shareholders seem to trust their judiciary. 
However, only the courts of  two states were mainly se-
lected by such shareholders, which were the courts of  
New York and the courts of  Delaware, what may be 
explained by the judgments of  such courts in matters 
of  corporate law and by its technical team. 
Concerning the applicable law to the contract, in Bra-
zil, to govern obligations, the law of  the country where 
they are constituted shall be applicable67. No Brazilian 
shareholder agreement has indicated the applicable law 
to the contract, because Brazilian law is automatically 
applied to national agreements. Particularly, in relation 
to shareholder’s agreements, the Brazilian Corporation 
Law, a federal law, is the main regulatory norm and can-
not be derogated by any state’s law68. On the contrary, 
in the U.S., the shareholders may choose which law will 
be applicable to their agreement. The laws most cho-
sen were Delaware’s corporate law (55,07%) and New 
York’s corporate law (26,08%). 
The preference for the little state of  Delaware may 
be explained by its reformist regime, which is sought 
by shareholders or managers who desire to guarantee 
a high value for the shares of  their company, since the 
law of  such state sets a higher protection to minority 
shareholders and contributes to global efficiency69. 
3. the style of shAreholder Agreements
Besides analyzing the use and content of  shareholder 
agreement, the article contributes to the examination of  
the design of  shareholder agreements in different coun-
tries. In general, American and Brazilian agreements 
have the same extension. It can be even observed that 
they have clauses that are really similar to each other, 
as the definitions clause. Hence, the study proved that 
stylistically the agreements from both countries are not 
as different as usually believed.
This finding contrasts with the literature on agree-
ments’ design in comparative law. Authors believe that, 
in Brazil, as in most European civil law countries, con-
tracts are less long than U.S. agreements70. This could be 
67 Law of  Introduction to the Civil Code (Decree-Law No. 4657), 
art. 9.
68 Brazilian Corporation Law (Law 6.404).  
69 HANSMANN, Henry; PARGENDLER, Mariana; GILSON, 
Ronald J. Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate 
Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union. Stan-
ford Law Review, Stanford, v. 63, p. 475-498, 2011.
70 LUNDMARK, Thomas. Verbose Contracts. American Journal of  
Comparative Law, Michigan, v. 49, p. 121, 2001; LANGBEIM, John 
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explained by the predictability of  civil law, which pro-
vides general rules for the signing of  agreements, has a 
gap-filling role and guarantees specific enforcement in 
any dispute71. Taking into account these variances be-
tween civil law and common law, there are theoretical 
discussions that claim that U.S. contracts are overly des-
criptive and detailed. 
Thomas Lundmark, for example, points to the 
following factors as responsible for the redundancy of  U.S. 
contracts72: (i) limited solutions for the granting of  com-
pensatory damages in the case of  breach of  contract, (ii) 
the informal and oral tradition of  common law, (iii) the ju-
risdictional diversity following federalism, and (iv) the pre-
ference for private arrangement of  business.
The first factor pointed out by Lundmark rises from 
the fact that common law countries do not grant spe-
cific performance to the parties of  an agreement, what 
obliges them to entirely rely on a legal proceeding73. 
Moreover, the second factor prevents the parties of  U.S. 
contracts from trusting documentary evidence, since 
witnesses have a larger role in common law countries. 
On the contrary, in civil law countries, a controversy 
arising from an agreement would be mainly solved by 
documentary evidence74. The third factor of  Lundma-
rk refers to the federalist system of  the U.S. He states 
that the main issue of  this factor is not on the state’s 
substantial law, but rather in the state’s procedural law, 
which is verbose and does not even guarantee specific 
performance75. At last, the forth factor relates to the 
fact that American businessman do not trust the State 
to solve their disputes. Therefore, they prefer to over 
detail the agreement and guarantee dispute resolution 
in the private sphere76.
John H. Langbein also states that U.S. contracts are 
more complex77. He justifies this statement by the third 
H. Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of  Complex Con-
tracts. American Journal of  Comparative Law, v. 35, p. 381, 1987.
71 LUNDMARK, Thomas. Verbose Contracts. American Journal of  
Comparative Law, Michigan, v. 49, p. 121-124, 2001.
72 LUNDMARK, Thomas. Verbose Contracts. American Journal of  
Comparative Law, Michigan, v. 49, p. 121-123, 2001.
73 LUNDMARK, Thomas. Verbose Contracts. American Journal of  
Comparative Law, Michigan, v. 49, p. 121-124, 2001.
74 LUNDMARK, Thomas. Verbose Contracts. American Journal of  
Comparative Law, Michigan, v. 49, p. 121-126, 2001.
75 LUNDMARK, Thomas. Verbose Contracts. American Journal of  
Comparative Law, Michigan, v. 49, p. 121-130, 2001.
76 LUNDMARK, Thomas. Verbose Contracts. American Journal of  
Comparative Law, Michigan, v. 49, p. 121-131, 2001.
77 LANGBEIM, John H. Comparative Civil Procedure and the 
factor of  Lundmark. Langbein says that, in the U.S., ci-
vil procedure is inefficient, because it is expensive, un-
predictable and do not discourage lawsuits, unlike the 
European civil law systems, which are more efficient 
and predictable78. 
The present article questions the continued relevan-
ce of  these authors’ assumptions, at least in the context 
of  shareholder agreements. The study did not find any 
relevant stylistic difference between shareholder agree-
ments of  Brazil and the U.S. In length, they are really 
similar. Also, some clauses are identically used. As an 
example, the definitions clause, which is a customary 
practice of  American corporate law, is being intense-
ly used in Brazil. The data collected indicates that 40 
Brazilian agreements (62,5%) and 36 U.S. agreements 
(52,17%) present such clause and have more than 30 de-
finitions. This may be explained by the increasing flow 
of  deals between American and Brazilian companies, as 
well as by the globalization of  Brazil’s companies, which 
are increasingly opening offices in other countries or 
being listed in American stock exchanges. 
4. conclusIon
This empirical and comparative study intended to 
investigate the use and content of  shareholder agree-
ments of  Brazilian and U.S. publicly held companies in 
order to analyze how the Brazilian experience diverges 
from a different corporate context.
Initially, the article proved that public traded com-
panies, including U.S. corporations, use shareholder 
agreements.  Secondly, it showed that while in Brazil 
such corporate instrument provides for central issues 
of  corporate governance, in the U.S. they are mostly 
employed in relation to corporate transactions, mainly 
establishing conditions to the election of  directors and 
restrictions to the free transferability of  shares. Particu-
larly, in Brazil, the previous meeting mechanism is wide-
ly used to bind the vote of  the signing shareholders and 
also of  the directors of  the company. On the contrary, 
in U.S. agreements, this voting restriction was not iden-
Style of  Complex Contracts. American Journal of  Comparative Law, v. 
35, p. 381-392, 1987. 
78 LANGBEIM, John H. Comparative Civil Procedure and the 
Style of  Complex Contracts. American Journal of  Comparative Law, v. 
35, p. 381-392, 1987.
M
A
SU
LL
O
, H
ele
na
. S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 in
 p
ub
lic
ly 
tra
de
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
: a
 c
om
pa
ris
on
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
U.
S.
 a
nd
 B
ra
zi
l. 
Re
vi
st
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
12
, n
. 2
, 2
01
5 
p.
 4
01
-4
19
415
tified. American voting agreements almost do not limit 
shareholder voting or restrict directors’ duties, being 
essentially used to elect directors. Thirdly, the study de-
monstrated that Brazilian shareholders establish a block 
of  control by means of  a shareholder agreement. This 
may indicate a rise of  dispersed ownership in Brazil’s 
capital market. In the Brazilian context, the article lea-
ds to the conclusion that shareholder agreements are 
overriding the best corporate governance practices, in 
such a way that corporate laws are infringed, as the pro-
tection of  minority shareholders and the duties of  care 
and loyalty of  directors and officers, and market rules 
are disrespected.
Fourthly, it evidences the preference of  Brazilian 
shareholders for arbitration as dispute resolution me-
thod, while U.S. shareholders trust the judiciary, predo-
minantly Delaware and New York courts.  
Lastly, the article revealed that the design of  sha-
reholder agreements in both countries is really similar, 
since there are no relevant stylistic differences between 
them. This finding demystifies the belief  that U.S. con-
tracts are necessarily longer than those from civil law 
countries. 
Beyond questioning dominant assumptions about 
the role of  shareholder agreements in public corpora-
tions, the conclusions of  this article open a space for 
discussing shareholder agreements in comparative law.
AppendIces
Table 1: Main Aspects of  Brazilian Shareholder Agreements
Company Date of  Signa-ture
Listing Seg-
ment
ALLIS PARTICIPAÇÕES 
S.A. 07/02/2011 OTC Mkt.
AMIL PARTICIPACOES 
S.A. 26/10/2012 OTC Mkt.
AREZZO INDÚSTRIA 
E COMÉRCIO S.A.
06/01/2011 Novo Mercado
AREZZO INDÚSTRIA 
E COMÉRCIO S.A.
06/01/2011 Novo Mercado
BCO BTG PACTUAL 
S.A. 29/02/2012 Standard
BCO DAYCOVAL S.A. 21/11/2011 Level 2
BCO INDUSVAL S.A. 30/03/2011 Level 2
BCO INDUSVAL S.A. 07/11/2011 Level 2
BCO MERCANTIL DO 
BRASIL S.A.
22/10/2010 Standard
BCO PANAMERICANO 
S.A. 26/07/2010 Level 1
BCO PANAMERICANO 
S.A. 31/01/2011 Level 1
BCO PINE S.A. 09/09/2011 Level 2
BRASIL INSURANCE 
PARTICIPAÇÕES E AD-
MINISTRAÇÃO S.A
27/03/2010 Novo Mercado
BRASIL TRAVEL TU-
RISMO E PARTICIPA-
ÇÕES S.A.
30/04/2012 Novo Mercado
BRASKEM S.A. 08/02/2010 Level 1
CIA CELG DE PARTI-
CIPACOES – CELGPAR
01/08/2011 Standard
CIA ENERGETICA 
DE MINAS GERAIS – 
CEMIG
01/08/2011 Level 1
COMPANHIA DE 
LOCAÇÃO DAS AMÉ-
RICAS
27/02/2012 Novo Mercado
CONCESSIONARIA 
RIO-TERESOPOLIS 
S.A.
25/04/2011 OTC Mkt.
COPERSUCAR S.A. 20/06/2011 Novo Mercado
DESENVIX ENERGIAS 
RENOVÁVEIS S.A.
08/03/2012 Bovespa Mais
DIMED S.A. 12/01/2012 Standard
ECORODOVIAS 
INFRAESTRUTURA E 
LOGÍSTICA S.A.
22/01/2010 Novo Mercado
Table 1: (continued)
Company Date of  Signa-ture
Listing Seg-
ment
ECORODOVIAS 
INFRAESTRUTURA E 
LOGÍSTICA S.A.
27/12/2012 Novo Mercado
EVEN CONSTRUTORA 
E INCORPORADORA 
S.A.
06/08/2012 Novo Mercado
FRIGOL FOODS PAR-
TICIPAÇÕES S.A.
08/03/2012 Standard
HIDROVIAS DO BRA-
SIL S.A.
27/03/2012 Standard
HYPERMARCAS S.A. 23/06/2010 Novo Mercado
INDUSTRIAS ROMI 
S.A. 05/11/2012 Novo Mercado
JBS S.A. 26/01/2010 Novo Mercado
JSL S.A. 19/03/2010 Novo Mercado
KROTON EDUCA-
CIONAL S.A.
28/09/2012 Novo Mercado
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KROTON EDUCA-
CIONAL S.A.
28/11/2012 Novo Mercado
MANABI S.A. 31/05/2011 Standard
MANABI S.A. 22/08/2012 Standard
MARCOPOLO S.A. 31/03/2012 Level 2
MARFRIG ALIMEN-
TOS S.A. 05/08/2010 Novo Mercado
MARISA LOJAS S.A. 31/03/2010 Novo Mercado
MILLS ESTRUTURAS E 
SERVIÇOS DE ENGE-
NHARIA S.A.
11/02/2011 Novo Mercado
MONTICIANO PAR-
TICIPACOES S.A.
08/07/2010 OTC Mkt.
NADIR FIGUEIREDO 
IND E COM S.A.
31/10/2011 Standard
NET SERVICOS DE 
COMUNICACAO S.A.
21/12/2012 Level 2
NET SERVICOS DE 
COMUNICACAO S.A.
21/12/2012 Level 2
PARANA BCO S.A. 25/05/2011 Level 1
PORTOBELLO S.A. 15/04/2011 Novo Mercado
QGEP PARTICI-
PAÇÕES S.A.
17/01/2011 Novo Mercado
Table 1: (continued)
Company Date of  Signa-ture
Listing Seg-
ment
QUALICORP S.A. 01/09/2010 Novo Mercado
RAIA DROGASIL S.A. 10/11/2011 Novo Mercado
RENOVA ENERGIA 
S.A. 19/08/2011 Level 2
RENOVA ENERGIA 
S.A. 06/11/2012 Level 2
SAO CARLOS EM-
PREEND E PARTICIPA-
COES S.A.
31/10/2011 Novo Mercado
SARAIVA S.A. 27/09/2011 Level 2
SPRINGER S.A. 31/07/2012 Standard
SUL 116 PARTICIPA-
COES S.A. 12/08/2010 OTC Mkt.
SUZANO PAPEL E 
CELULOSE S.A. 30/05/2011 Level1
TECHNOS S.A. 31/05/2011 Novo Mercado
ULTRAPAR PARTICIPA-
COES S.A. 01/04/2011 Novo Mercado
UNICASA INDÚSTRIA 
DE MÓVEIS S.A.
14/03/2012 Novo Mercado
UNIVERSO ONLINE 
S.A. 27/01/2011 Level 2
UNIVERSO ONLINE 
S.A. 27/01/2011 Level 2
USINAS SID DE MINAS 
GERAIS S.A.- USIMI-
NAS
16/01/2012 Level 1
USINAS SID DE MINAS 
GERAIS S.A.- USIMI-
NAS
18/02/2011 Level 1
VIA VAREJO S.A. (GLO-
BEX UTILIDADES S.A.)
01/07/2010 Standard
VIGOR ALIMENTOS 
S.A. 19/06/2012 Novo Mercado
Source: Own Elaboration based on electronic survey.
Table 2: Main Aspects of  U.S. Shareholder Agreements
Company Date of  Signa-ture Listing
SCHIFF NUTRITION 
INTERNATIONAL, 
INC.
14/10/2010 NYSE
PARKWAY PROPER-
TIES, INC.
5/6/2012 NYSE
GREENMAN TECH-
NOLOGIES, INC.
30/04/2012 OTC Mkt.
KENNEDY-WILSON 
HOLDINGS, INC.
13/08/2010 NYSE
CHINA BCT PHARMA-
CY GROUP, INC.
2011 OTC Mkt.
BUCYRUS INTERNA-
TIONAL, INC.
19/02/2010 NASDAQ
ASCENT SOLAR 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
12/08/2011 NASDAQ
HCP, INC. 13/12/2010 NYSE
CTC MEDIA,INC. 20/05/2011 NASDAQ
WATSCO, INC. 27/04/2012 NYSE
TTM TECHNOLOGIES, 
INC.
09/04/2010 NASDAQ
CHINDEX INTERNA-
TIONAL, INC.
14/06/2010 NASDAQ
THOMAS PROPERTIES 
GROUP, INC.
29/05/2012 NYSE
PEOPLE’S LIBERA-
TION, INC.
22/02/2012 OTC Mkt.
HALCÓN RESOURCES 
CORPORATION
06/12/2012 NYSE
BONDS.COM GROUP, 
INC.
11/01/2010 OTC Mkt.
BONDS.COM GROUP, 
INC.
19/10/2010 OTC Mkt.
BONDS.COM GROUP, 
INC.
05/12/2011 OTC Mkt.
BONDS.COM GROUP, 
INC.
02/02/2011 OTC Mkt.
SILGAN HOLDINGS 
INC.
12/04/2011 NASDAQ
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AMN HEALTHCARE 
SERVICES, INC.
28/07/2010 NYSE
INTERLINE BRANDS, 
INC.
07/09/2012 NYSE
DEERFIELD CAPITAL 
CORP 2011 NASDAQ
TEGAL CORPORA-
TION
12/07/2012 NASDAQ
CARPENTER TECH-
NOLOGY CORPORA-
TION
29/02/2012 NYSE
EXPRESS, INC. 23/04/2011 NYSE
REAL GOODS SOLAR, 
INC.
19/12/2011 NASDAQ
TRIUMPH GROUP, 
INC.
23/03/2010 NYSE
Table 2: (continued)
Company Date of  Signa-ture Listing
ACADIA HEALTH-
CARE COMPANY INC.
01/11/2011 NASDAQ
MEDIA GENERAL, 
INC.
24/05/2012 NYSE
RECOVERY ENERGY, 
INC.
23/06/2010 NASDAQ
URANIUM RESOURC-
ES, INC.
01/03/2012 NASDAQ
TRIDENT MICROSYS-
TEMS, INC.
28/04/2011 OTC Mkt.
QUIKSILVER, INC. 09/08/2010 NYSE
BIOFUEL ENERGY 
CORP
24/09/2010 NASDAQ
APPLIED NATURAL 
GAS FUELS, INC.
24/03/2010 OTC Mkt.
TEXAS RARE EARTH 
RESOURCES CORP
21/01/2011 OTC Mkt.
GRAHAM PACKAGING 
COMPANY INC.
10/02/2010 NYSE
SPIRIT AIRLINES,INC. 01/06/2011 NASDAQ
WALKER& 
DUNLOP,INC.
20/12/2010 NYSE
WESCO AIRCRAFT 
HOLDINGS,INC.
27/07/2011 NYSE
BOOZ ALLEN HAM-
ILTON HOLDING 
CORPORATION
08/11/2010 NYSE
ALLISON TRANSMIS-
SION HOLDINGS, INC.
12/03/2012 NYSE
REGIONAL MANAGE-
MENT CORP
27/03/2012 NYSE
MIDSTATES PETRO-
LEUM COMPANY, INC.
24/04/2012 NYSE
GSE HOLDING,INC. 15/02/2012 NYSE
MEDQUIST HOLD-
INGS INC.
04/02/2011 NASDAQ
SOLAR ENERTECH 
CORP
07/01/2010 OTC Mkt.
SMTC CORPORATION 05/01/2012 NASDAQ
HYSTER-YALE MA-
TERIALS HANDLING, 
INC.
28/09/2012 NYSE
EXPEDIA, INC. 20/12/2011 NASDAQ
NACCO INDUSTRIES 
INC.
28/09/2012 NYSE
MANNING AND 
NAPIER INC.
23/12/2011 NYSE
IRONCLAD PERFOR-
MANCE WEAR CORP
14/12/2012 OTC Mkt.
TAL INTERNATIONAL 
GROUP,INC.
23/03/2012 NYSE
ZIX CORPORATION 28/12/2012 NASDAQ
Table 2: (continued)
Company Date of  Signa-ture Listing
EXPEDIA, INC. 20/12/2011 NASDAQ
OPTIONS MEDIA 
GROUP HOLDINGS, 
INC.
16/04/2010 OTC Mkt.
BLACKROCK, INC. 15/11/2010 NYSE
TURKPOWER CORP 
(NOW: ZINCO DO 
BRASIL, INC.)
28/06/2011 OTC Mkt.
TRIPADVISOR, INC. 20/12/2011 NASDAQ
RSC HOLDINGS INC. 06/10/2011 NYSE
HIGH PLAINS GAS, 
INC.
18/11/2011 OTC Mkt.
WONDER AUTO 
TECHNOLOGY, INC.
05/10/2011 OTC Mkt.
LPL INVESTMENT 
HOLDINGS, INC.
23/11/2010 NASDAQ
BRAZIL FAST FOOD 
CORP
22/12/2010 OTC Mkt.
LUMOS NETWORKS 
CORP.
31/10/2011 NASDAQ
WUHAN GENERAL 
GROUP (CHINA), INC.
13/12/2010 OTC Mkt.
TALON INTERNA-
TIONAL, INC.
30/07/2010 OTC Mkt.
Source: Own Elaboration based on electronic survey.
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